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MINIMIZING ANTITRUST RISKS IN JOINT 
VENTURES, JOINT BIDDING, AND AMIs: 
A REVIEW OF RECENT ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 
WILLIAM M. KATZ, JR., CATHERINE CLEMONS & ALEXANDER T. DIMOCK∗ 
Federal and state antitrust enforcers have recently focused their attention 
on some common practices in the oil and gas industry: joint ventures, joint 
bidding, and area of mutual interest (AMI) agreements. These enforcement 
actions highlight the need to proactively analyze the potential antitrust risks 
of these types of agreements, which typically involve entities that otherwise 
compete with each other. After summarizing the relevant antitrust laws, this 
article explains the significance of the recent enforcement actions and 
suggests some best practices to help minimize the antitrust risks in future 
transactions. 
I. Federal and State Antitrust Laws 
The Sherman Act is the primary federal antitrust statute and every state 
has some state-law variation of it, which means that one must consider both 
federal and state enforcement actions, in addition to the possibility of 
private civil litigation.1 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that “[e]very contract, 
combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Mr. Katz is a partner, and Ms. Clemons and Mr. Dimock are associates, in the 
Dallas office of Thompson & Knight LLP. 
 1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (West 2016); see THE ANTITRUST LAWS, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) 
(“[M]ost states have antitrust laws that are enforced by state attorneys general or private 
plaintiffs. Many of these statutes are based on the federal antitrust laws.”). 
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the several States or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”2 
Because every contract restrains trade to some degree, courts have found 
that a Section 1 violation arises only from agreements that unreasonably 
restrain trade. Courts apply two tests to determine if an agreement 
unreasonably restrains trade: (1) the per se test, and (2) the rule of reason. 
The per se test applies to a narrow group of agreements that are 
unreasonable as a matter of law, including price fixing, bid rigging, market 
division, and group boycotts.3 The rule of reason applies to a wider range of 
agreements, and considering the defendant’s intent and motive, balances an 
agreement’s procompetitive and anticompetitive effects to determine if it 
unreasonably restrains trade.4 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act applies to any “person who shall 
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations.” A Section 2 violation 
requires proof of monopoly power in a relevant market and the willful 
acquisition or maintenance of that power.5 In layman’s terms, this means 
that the defendant must be both “big” and “bad.” 
 
                                                                                                                 
 2. 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 3. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (“[T]here are 
certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and 
lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore 
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business 
excuse for their use.”). 
 4. See F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457–58 (1986) (“Under our 
precedents, a restraint may be adjudged unreasonable either because it fits within a class of 
restraints that has been held to be per se unreasonable, or because it violates what has come 
to be known as the Rule of Reason, under which the test of legality is whether the restraint 
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it 
is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984) (“[D]espite the fact that this case 
involves restraints on the ability of member institutions to compete in terms of price and 
output, a fair evaluation of their competitive character requires consideration of the NCAA’s 
justifications for the restraints”). 
 5. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993) (“[T]he plaintiff 
charging attempted monopolization must prove a dangerous probability of actual 
monopolization, which has generally required a definition of the relevant market and 
examination of market power.”); see also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 
570–71 (1966) (“The offense of monopoly under [§] 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: 
(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition 
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”). 
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The Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforce federal antitrust laws. 
State antitrust laws are typically enforced by state attorneys general. 
Depending on the conduct at issue and the relevant enforcement agency, 
antitrust violations may result in criminal or civil fines, jail time for 
individuals, or conduct-based remedies.6 As the cases discussed below 
indicate, private litigation (often in the class-action form) follows hot on the 
heels of federal or state antitrust investigations. 
II. Oil and Gas Agreements 
Three types of agreements have recently caused federal and state 
antitrust enforcers to focus on the oil and gas industry: (1) AMI agreements; 
(2) joint-bidding agreements; and (3) joint ventures. AMI agreements can 
be risky because they require participants to offer opportunities within the 
AMI to their counterparties on a pro rata basis, thereby reducing the 
incentive of the counterparties to compete for opportunities, or obtain a 
superior position, within the AMI. Joint-bidding agreements can be risky 
because they involve competitors agreeing to act jointly with respect to a 
bid or bids, thereby reducing the number of potential bidders for a lease or 
group of leases. Finally, joint ventures can be risky because they sometimes 
facilitate collusion and the sharing of competitively sensitive information, 
in addition to eliminating other potential bidders. 
III. Recent Antitrust Enforcement Actions and Litigation 
A. United States v. SG Interests and Gunnison Energy Corporation 
In 2005, the Bureau of Land Management published notice that it would 
be offering certain parcels for sale at an auction.7 Shortly before the 
auction, SG Interests (SGI) and Gunnison Energy Corporation (GEC) 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See, e.g., THE ANTITRUST LAWS, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) (“The penalties for 
violating the Sherman Act can be severe. Although most enforcement actions are civil, the 
Sherman Act is also a criminal law, and individuals and businesses that violate it may be 
prosecuted by the Department of Justice.… The Sherman Act imposes criminal penalties of 
up to $100 million for a corporation and $1 million for an individual, along with up to 10 
years in prison. Under federal law, the maximum fine may be increased to twice the amount 
the conspirators gained from the illegal acts or twice the money lost by the victims of the 
crime, if either of those amounts is over $100 million.”). 
 7. Complaint, DOJ v. SG Interests I, Ltd., SG Interests VII, Ltd. and Gunnison Energy 
Corporation, 2012 WL 696249 ¶¶ 7–10 (D. Colo. Feb. 15, 2012). 
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entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) and an AMI 
agreement.8 The MOU called for SGI to bid on three of the leases for sale, 
and if successful, to assign GEC a 50% interest in any leases acquired.9 In 
exchange, GEC agreed not to bid at the auction.10 Under the AMI, the 
parties agreed to acquire producing wells, acreage, and a gathering 
system.11 Consistent with the MOU, SGI acquired the leases during the 
auction and assigned the 50% interests to GEC.12 
After conducting a two-year investigation, the DOJ challenged the MOU 
under Section 1 and found that it amounted to illegal bid rigging.13 SGI and 
GEC paid $550,000 to settle with the DOJ.14 The DOJ did not, however, 
challenge the AMI agreement. This is likely because the DOJ determined 
that it was part of a legitimate, efficiency-enhancing joint venture under the 
rule-of-reason test.15 
B. The Federal and State Investigations of Chesapeake, Aubrey 
McClendon, and Encana 
In 2012, news reports sparked a DOJ investigation of Encana 
Corporation and Chesapeake Energy Corporation for allegedly colluding to 
suppress lease prices at an October 2010 state-land lease auction in 
Michigan.16 The DOJ focused on emails exchanged between the two 
companies that discussed competitively sensitive information and used 
phrases like avoiding “bidding each other up.”17 Despite these emails, the 
DOJ closed the investigation in April 2014 without making any formal 
charges.18 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id. ¶¶ 11–21. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See United States v. SG Interests I, Ltd., No. 12-cv-00395-RPM, 2013 WL 1932944 
(D. Colo. Apr. 22, 2013) (ordering SGI to pay $275,000); United States v. Gunnison Energy 
Corp., No. 12-cv-00395-RPM, 2013 WL 1933990 (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 2013) (ordering GEC 
to pay $275,000). 
 14. See supra note 13. 
 15. See supra note 4. 
 16. Joshua Schneyer and Anna Driver, Exclusive: Chesapeake, Encana near settlements 
on Michigan collusion probe (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-encana-
chesapeake-idUSBREA1P0TJ20140226. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Joe Carroll, Probe Into Chesapeake and Encana Michigan Gas Leases Ends (May 
1, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-01/probe-into-chesapeake-and-
encana-michigan-gas-leases-ends. 
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However, the DOJ’s decision did not stop Michigan’s attorney general 
and Department of Natural Resources from bringing their own actions 
against both companies. Encana ultimately pleaded no-contest to state 
antitrust violations, paid a $5 million fine, and agreed to cooperate in the 
ongoing investigation of Chesapeake.19 In April 2015, Chesapeake agreed 
to settle with Michigan during trial, by pleading no-contest to attempted 
antitrust violations and false pretenses and establishing a $25 million 
victim-compensation fund.20 
Separately, on March 1, 2016, a federal grand jury indicted Chesapeake’s 
former CEO, Aubrey McClendon, for allegedly conspiring with another 
unnamed oil and gas company to rig bids for prospective acreage in the 
Anadarko Basin.21 The DOJ described the indictment as “the first case 
resulting from an ongoing federal antitrust investigation into price fixing, 
bid rigging, and other anticompetitive conduct in the oil and natural gas 
industry.”22 But the DOJ moved to dismiss the indictment the next day “for 
the reason that such action would best meet the ends of justice in that the 
defendant is now deceased” as the result of an automobile accident.23 
C. Private Civil Lawsuits 
As mentioned above, private litigation often follows federal or state 
antitrust investigations. And the federal and state investigations of 
Chesapeake, Aubrey McClendon, and Encana were no exception. 
Chesapeake paid over $19 million to settle private civil litigation filed after 
the 2012 news reports and DOJ investigation, and a number of other private 
antitrust lawsuits have since been filed: (1) NorthStar Energy, LLC sued 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Joy Yearout, Schuette Annoucnes $5 Million Civil Settlement, Criminal No Contest 
Plea by Encana Oil & Gas USA to Resolve Bid-Rigging Allegations (May 5, 2014), 
http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-164-46849_47203-327764--,00.html. 
 20. Andrea Bitely, Schuette, Creagh Annouce $25 Million Civil Settlement, Two 
Criminal No Contest Pleas by Chesapeake Energy Corp, to Resovle Racketeering, Bid-
Rigging Allegations (April 24, 2015), http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-164-46849-
353198--,00.html. 
 21. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Former CEO Indicted for 
Masterminding Conspiracy Not to Compete for Oil and Natural Gas Leases (March 1, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-ceo-indicted-masterminding-conspiracy-not-
compete-oil-and-natural-gas-leases. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Motion to Dismiss, United States v. McClendon, No. 16-cr-00043M (W.D. Okla. 
March 3, 2016). 
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both Encana and Chesapeake;24 (2) landowners filed (and continue to file) 
antitrust claims related to a joint venture in Pennsylvania’s Marcellus 
Shale;25 and (3) a consolidated class-action lawsuit against Chesapeake and 
SandRidge Energy was filed in Oklahoma.26 
1. NorthStar Energy, LLC sues Encana and Chesapeake 
In February 2013, NorthStar sued Encana and Chesapeake, alleging 
collusion between the two companies to restrict the price of land sales in 
Michigan through an agreement not to bid against each other for certain 
leasing rights.27 NorthStar claimed that this agreement reduced competition 
and lowered the prices it received for its land.28 To support its claim, 
NorthStar pointed to the publicly disclosed emails between Encana and 
Chesapeake, as well as the companies’ internal documents.29 
Chesapeake and Encana each moved to dismiss NorthStar’s antitrust 
claim for failure to allege an actionable agreement to depress prices, but the 
Court denied the Companies’ motions at the pleading stage, because it 
found that NorthStar alleged a plausible agreement and an actionable 
exchange of competitively sensitive information.30 At this time, the case is 
currently scheduled for trial in November 2017 and discovery is ongoing. 
2. Pennsylvania lawsuits filed against Chesapeake, Access Midstream, 
Anadarko E&P, Statoil USA, and Mitsui E&P 
In February 2015, over ninety Pennsylvania landowners filed a lawsuit 
alleging, among other things, (1) that Chesapeake and Access Midstream 
used unlawful monopoly power over natural gas pipeline systems to reduce 
gas royalty payments to landowners; (2) that Chesapeake and Anadarko 
established an AMI with the intention “to restrict competition between 
them”; and (3) that Statoil USA and Mitsui E&P “later joined in and 
provided critical financial support for the conspiracy, acting with 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Northstar Energy LLC, v. Encana Corp., Chesapeake Energy Corporation, and 
O.I.L. Niagaran, LLC, 2013 WL 2658564 (W.D.Mich.). 
 25. Amended Complaint, A&B Family LLC et al.  v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., No. 
3:15-340 (M.D. Penn. July 18, 2015). 
 26. Amended Complaint, Thieme et al v. Chesapeake Energy Corp. et al, No. 16-cv-209 
(W.D. Okla. Mar. 8, 2016). 
 27. Northstar Energy LLC, v. Encana Corp., Chesapeake Energy Corporation, and 
O.I.L. Niagaran, LLC, 2013 WL 2658564 (W.D.Mich.). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
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knowledge of and with the intent to enable Chesapeake and Anadarko to 
fully exploit, the anticompetitive and restrictive AMI.”31 
According to the landowners’ lawyers, “[w]hile several class action 
lawsuits and class arbitrations have been filed against Chesapeake based on 
similar allegations, this is the first direct action by Pennsylvania royalty 
owners seeking to address what we believe is one of the underlying causes 
of the problem—the fact that the gathering pipeline system in most of 
Bradford County, and in parts of Sullivan, Susquehanna and Wyoming 
counties, were, and for the most part still are, owned and controlled by the 
same companies responsible for paying royalties on the gas transported 
through those pipelines, resulting in an inherent conflict of interest, as well 
as harm to competition.”32 
In September 2015, without explanation, the landowners voluntarily 
dismissed Statoil USA. The remaining defendants’ motions to dismiss are 
currently pending.33 
More than 400 additional landowners filed similar claims in 
Pennsylvania federal court in June 2016.34 According to attorneys for the 
plaintiffs, hundreds more will file suit in the coming months. A federal 
judge certified a similar class action in Ohio in September.35 
3. Oklahoma class-action lawsuit filed against Chesapeake, SandRidge 
Energy, and Tom Ward 
Although the DOJ dismissed its indictment against Aubrey McClendon, 
the allegations contained in that indictment continue. On March 3, 2016, 
landowners filed a class-action lawsuit against Chesapeake; SandRidge 
Energy (the abovementioned unnamed oil and gas company); and 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See supra note 25, ¶¶ 242–43. 
 32. Thomas McNamara, Indik & McNamara, P.C. Announces Antitrust and RICO 
Lawsuit Against Chesapeake Energy and Williams Partners By Landowners in Bradford 
County, Pennsylvania (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2015/02/ 
prweb12528188.htm. 
 33. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice of Statoil USA Onshore 
Properties, Inc., A&B Family LLC et al.  v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., No. 3:15-340 (M.D. 
Penn. Sept. 17, 2015). 
 34. Cara Bayles, Chesapeake, Anadarko Staked Out Marcellus, RICO Suit Says, (July 5, 
2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/813665/chesapeake-anadarko-staked-out-marcellus-
rico-suit-says. 
 35. Second Amended Class Action Complaint, Henceroth et al. v. Chesapeake 
Exploration, LLC, No. 4:15-cv-02591-BYP (N.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2016). 
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SandRidge’s co-founder, Tom Ward.36 According to the landowners’ 
complaint “Defendants and their co-conspirators agreed to, and did in fact, 
restrain trade or commerce by bid rigging and depressing the prices for 
leasehold interest and producing properties below competitive levels.”37 
SandRidge filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in May 2016.38 In response, 
the Court administratively terminated the case until after SandRidge’s 
bankruptcy proceeding concluded.39 SandRidge emerged from bankruptcy 
on October 4, 2016.40 And, on October 13, 2016, the landowners moved the 
court to reopen the case.41 
IV. Lessons Learned 
The recent enforcement actions and litigation described above provide 
some important lessons for future oil and gas agreements. 
1. Any agreement should identify the business justification for it. If 
a legitimate business justification is lacking, enforcers are more 
likely to view it as anticompetitive. 
2. The parties should maintain competition outside the scope of 
their agreement. Antitrust enforcers are concerned that 
collaborative agreements—like AMIs, joint bids, or joint 
ventures—can be used to facilitate collusion outside that 
particular agreement, so parties should continue to vigorously 
compete outside the scope of their agreement. 
3. Antitrust risks are lessened when parties enter into an agreement 
to do something together that they could not, or would not, do 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Amended Complaint, Thieme et al v. Chesapeake Energy Corp. et al, No. 16-cv-209 
(W.D. Okla. Mar. 8, 2016). 
 37. Id. ¶ 41. 
 38. http://investors.sandridgeenergy.com/investor-relations/press-releases/press-release-
details/2016/SandRidge-Energy-Files-Pre-Arranged-Reorganization-Under-Chapter-11-
Announcing-Restructuring-Support-Agreement-with-Creditors-Holding-Over-Two-Thirds-
of-its-41-Billion-in-Funded-Debt-Obligations/default.aspx. 
 39. Administrative Closing Order, Thieme et al v. Chesapeake Energy Corp. et al, No. 
16-cv-209 (W.D. Okla. May 20, 2016). 
 40. http://investors.sandridgeenergy.com/investor-relations/press-releases/press-release-
details/2016/SandRidge-Energy-Emerges-from-Reorganization-with-Approximately-525-
Million-of-Liquidity/default.aspx 
 41. Motion to Reopen Case, Thieme et al v. Chesapeake Energy Corp. et al, No. 16-cv-
209 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 13, 2016). 
 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss5/5
2017]       Minimizing Risks in Joint Ventures, Joint Bidding & AMIs 541 
 
 
individually. For example, a project that is too big or expensive 
for one company to undertake alone is a prime candidate for a 
procompetitive joint venture. 
4. Parties should avoid exchanging competitively sensitive 
information with their counterparties. Antitrust enforcers dislike 
parties exchanging information, plans, or strategies about current 
or future pricing, leasing, development, or bidding. 
5. Parties should remember that there is often a sliding scale for 
antitrust risk. If there are only a few potential bidders, it is more 
risky to enter into an AMI or joint bidding agreement, because it 
will reduce the number of bidders even further. 
6. Parties should have a robust antitrust compliance, training, and 
audit program. This will help sensitize employees to the antitrust 
risks associated with their jobs and identify problem areas in 
advance, which will help reduce the likelihood of a federal or 
state antitrust enforcer knocking on the door. 
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